O\u27Neill v. United States by unknown
1998 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-1-1998 
O'Neill v. United States 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1998 
Recommended Citation 
"O'Neill v. United States" (1998). 1998 Decisions. 99. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1998/99 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1998 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed May 1, 1998 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 




BONNIE A. O'NEILL, on behalf of herself and the es tate of 
Kerryn L. O'Neill; EDMUND J. O'NEILL, 




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
(D.C. Civ. No. 96-cv-00800) 
 
SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING 
 
Present: BECKER, Chief Judge, 
SLOVITER, STAPLETON, MANSMANN, GREENBERG, 
SCIRICA, COWEN, NYGAARD, ALITO, ROTH, McKEE and 
RENDELL, Circuit Judges, and POLLAK,*  District Judge 
 
The petition for rehearing filed by appellants in the 
above-entitled case having been submitted to the judges 
who participated in the decision of this Court and to all the 
other available circuit judges of the circuit in regular active 
service, and no judge who concurred in the decision having 
asked for rehearing, and a majority of the circuit judges of 
the circuit in regular service not having voted for rehearing, 






*The Honorable Louis H. Pollak, United States District Judge for the 




banc, is denied. Chief Judge Becker would grant rehearing 
for the reasons set forth in the attached Statement. 
 
       BY THE COURT, 
 
       /s/ Anthony J. Scirica  
 
        Circuit Judge 
 
Dated: May 1, 1998 
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STATEMENT SUR DENIAL OF THE 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
The panel has concluded that the O'Neill family's 
wrongful death claim is barred by the doctrine announced 
in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) and its 
progeny. I do not believe that it is. 
 
The government relies heavily on the opinion in United 
States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985), where the Supreme 
Court held that the family of a service member could not 
recover under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") for the 
death of their son who was murdered by a fellow service 
member. The facts of this case, however, are quite different 
from those in Shearer. So far as we can tell from the 
published opinions in Shearer, the men involved served 
together; their relationship was formed on this basis; and 
the court reasonably concluded that the injury occurred 
"incident to service." In contrast, the relationship between 
Kerryn O'Neill and her assailant was a purely personal 
one.** Indeed, it is difficult for me to imagine anything less 
incident to service than being attacked by an ex-lover while 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
**O'Neill, a Naval officer, was murdered by her former fiance, Ensign 
George Smith. O'Neill met Smith at the United States Naval Academy 
where they both attended school. After graduation O'Neill was assigned 
to a naval base in San Diego. Coincidentally, Smith was sent to the same 
base several months later in preparation for a tour of duty on a 
submarine. Shortly after Smith's arrival in San Diego, O'Neill broke off 
their engagement and he began to stalk her. One night while O'Neill was 
sitting in her on-base apartment watching a movie with a friend, Smith 
came to her building, shot and killed her and her companion and then 
killed himself. 
 
Smith had been given a battery of psychological tests to determine his 
psychological fitness for submarine duty. On this "Subscreen" test he 
had scored four standard deviations above normal levels (in the 99.99 
percentile) for aggressive/destructive behavior. He had also scored more 
than two standard deviations above normal levels in six other categories 
-- including impulsive and manipulative behavior. Under Naval 
procedures, these results should have been forwarded to the Department 
of Psychiatry at the Naval Hospital for a full psychological evaluation. 
O'Neill's family, with considerable force, urges that the Navy was 
negligent in failing to follow-up on these extreme test results. 
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sitting at home watching a movie with a friend. Surely, 
Smith would have killed O'Neill even if she was a civilian at 
the time. 
 
The government urges that the primary rationale for the 
Feres doctrine -- the desire to prevent the judiciary from 
second-guessing sensitive military decisions -- is implicated 
in this case. However, the gravamen of the Feres doctrine is 
that the government is immune from suit when injuries 
occur incident to service. If a civilian friend of O'Neill's had 
been murdered by Smith, the same concerns regarding 
second-guessing military judgments would be implicated, 
but I do not believe that we would dismiss the lawsuit. 
Similarly, where a plaintiff has engaged in an activity of a 
civilian nature, the "incident to service" test is not satisfied 
and the Feres bar has not been applied. See e.g., Johnson 
v. United States, 704 F.2d 1431, 1439 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 
In Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949), the 
government made an argument similar to that raised here, 
that because military decisions would be questioned suit 
should be barred under the FTCA. The Supreme Court 
ruled that the rationale was irrelevant if the incident to 
service test was not satisfied: 
 
       The Government envisages dire consequences should 
       we reverse. . . [a] battle commander's poor judgment, 
       an army surgeon's slip of hand, a defective jeep . .. all 
       would ground tort actions against the United States. 
       But we are dealing with an accident which had nothing 
       to do with the [plaintiffs'] army careers, injuries not 
       caused by their service except in the sense that all 
       human events depend upon what has already 
       transpired. Were the accident incident to the 
       [plaintiffs'] service, a wholly different case would be 
       presented. 
 
Id. at 52. In Feres and Shearer, the court was presented 
with "wholly different cases," cases where the service 
members' injuries occurred incident to their service. 
However, here, where decedent's injuries were wholly 
unrelated to her military service, we should follow the 
Supreme Court's direction in Brooks and not be swayed by 
the military judgment rationale. Because I think that this 
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case has been wrongly decided, and because of the 
importance of the issue, I vote for rehearing en banc (see 
Third Circuit I.O.P. 9.3.1). I acknowledge that under my 
view there will occasionally be cases in which so-called 
second guessing occurs, but the Supreme Court's 
jurisprudence does not extirpate every incarnation of that 
phenomenon, see Brooks, supra. 
 
In the decades following the decision in Feres, the case 
was subjected to considerable criticism from both the 
courts and the academy. In United States v. Johnson, 481 
U.S. 681, 700 (1987), Justice Scalia was joined by three 
other justices in a dissent in which he remarked that "Feres 
was wrongly decided and heartily deserves the `widespread, 
almost universal criticism' it has received." (citing Agent 
Orange Product Liability Litigation, 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 
(E.D.N.Y. 1984). In Peluso v. United States, 474 F.2d 605 
(3d Cir. 1973) (per curiam), we expressed the view that 
Feres was wrongly decided and the hope that the Supreme 
Court would reverse it, observing that the "facts pleaded 
here, if true, cry out for a remedy." Id. at 606. And in 
Hinkie v. United States, 715 F.2d 96, 97 (3d Cir. 1983), we 
dismissed a lawsuit under the Feres bar, but only after 
noting that "[w]e are forced once again to decide a case 
where `we sense the injustice . . . of [the] result.' " Moreover, 
as I document in the margin, scholarly criticism of the 
doctrine is legion.*** 
 
In the last decade, however, these voices of courts and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
***See, e.g., Jonathan P. Tomes,Feres to Chappell to Stanley: Three 
Strikes and Servicemembers Are Out, 25 U. Rich. L. Rev. 93 (1990); 
Barry Bennett, The Feres Doctrine, Discipline and the Weapons of War, 
29 St. Louis U. L.J. 383 (1984); David E. Seidelson, The Feres Exception 
to the Federal Tort Claims Act: New Insight Into an Old Problem, 11 
Hofstra L. Rev. 629 (1983); Thomas M. Gallagher, Note, Servicemembers' 
Rights Under the Feres Doctrine: Rethinking`Incident To Service' 
Analysis, 33 Vill. L. Rev. 175 (1988); David S. Schwartz, Note, Making 
Intramilitary Tort Law More Civil: A Proposed Reform of the Feres 
Doctrine, 95 Yale L. J. 992 (1986); William S. Meyers, Comment, The 
Feres Doctrine: Has It Created Remediless Wrongs For Relatives of 
Servicemen?, 44 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 929 (1983); Note, From Feres to Stencel: 
Should Military Personnel Have Access to FTCA Recovery?, 77 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1099 (1979); 
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commentators have died down. Everyone seems to have 
given up. But the harshness of the doctrine remains. Just 
look at the injustice suffered by the family of Kerryn O'Neill. 
Bolstered by the oft-quoted words of Justice Frankfurter: 
 
       Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to 
       reject it merely because it comes late. 
 
Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949), 
I urge the Supreme Court to grant certiorari and reconsider 
Feres. Judge Sloviter and Judge McKee join in this 
Statement. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
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